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EXPANSION OF ARREST POWER: A KEY TO
EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION
Lisa G. Lerman*
INTRODUCTION
Proper police handling of domestic violence cases is funda-
mental to successful prosecution, since battered women who want
help from the criminal justice system generally turn to the police
first. Because the police act as gatekeepers to the criminal justice
system, their conduct may determine both whether the victim will
pursue criminal charges and whether she will cooperate if charges
are filed. Every aspect of police intervention, therefore, affects any
subsequent prosecution.
From a prosecutor's point of view, there are three important
aspects of police response: (1) that police file accurate reports for
use at subsequent trial; (2) that the police make arrests which
comport with due process; and (3) that police temporarily detain
defendants who may intimidate complaining witnesses, so that
conditions may be placed on their release. Police are reluctant to
file reports or to take batterers into custody because so few domes-
tic cases result in prosecution. Officers feel their time is wasted.1
Prosecutors who vigorously pursue prosecution of spousal assaults
and prohibit dismissal of charges encourage increased arrests by
police which, in turn, facilitate successful prosecution.
Furthermore, if an arrest is made, a prosecutor who works
closely with the police can expect that a report will be sent to his
office and that evidence will be preserved. Similarly, the prosecutor
can expect cooperation from the police in obtaining a conviction.
An arrest places the burden on the prosecutor to initiate fur-
ther action, rather than leaving the onus on the victim to find out
what remedies are available to her. She may not seek help because
of ignorance, fear of retaliation, or feelings of helplessness. An ar-
rest, on the other hand, increases the likelihood of victim coopera-
* Lisa G. Lerman is an attorney with the Women's Rights Clinic of Antioch School of
Law, Washington, D.C. A graduate of New York University School of Law, she was previ-
ously Staff Attorney at the Center for Women Policy Studies.
Portions of this article are reprinted with permission from Response to Violence in the
Family, c1980, Center for Women Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.
1. Consensus of thirty police officers, Domestic Violence Class, F.B.I. Nat'l Acad. in
Quantico, Va. (July 15, 1981).
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tion. The International Association of Chiefs of Police states that
"A policy of arrest, when the elements of the offense are present,
promotes the well-being of the victim. . . .The officer who starts
legal action may give the wife courage she needs to realistically
face and correct her situation."'2
Immediate arrest may prevent further injury. Lenore Walker,
Director of the Battered Women Research Center in Denver, Colo-
rado, reports that police are most often called during the "acute
battering incident," the second phase of the abuse syndrome, dur-
ing which one or more severe beatings may occur.3 This phase usu-
ally lasts between 2 and 24 hours.4 A victim may be in serious dan-
ger if the police who respond depart, leaving both parties in the
residence. This danger may not be apparent because abusers are
often polite and deferential in the presence of police.5
Finally, an arrest communicates to the parties that the abuser
has committed a crime, that the victim has a right not to be
beaten, and that the criminal justice system will act to stop the
abuse. If the police remain at the scene of a domestic disturbance
for 20 minutes to talk to the couple and "cool things off," and then
depart, the police leave both the victim and the abuser with a mes-
sage that no crime has been committed, and that no serious conse-
quences will follow from calling the police.
To advocate more frequent arrest of abusers is not to suggest
that arrest is always appropriate or sufficient. In some cases there
may not be probable cause that a crime was committed. In others,
an abuser may go home and use the arrest as an excuse for further
beatings. Police must be trained to analyze the situation carefully
before taking any action. The risk of precipitating another beating
by making an arrest may be reduced by detaining the abuser over-
2. INT'L A. OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, WIFE BEATING: TRAINING KEY No. 245 at 4 (1976).
3. Walker outlines a "cycle of violence" which appears to be repeated again and again
in violent relationships. Stage one involves a build-up of tension in the abuser, during which
he becomes increasingly violence-prone. Stage two involves an outburst of violence, during
which the abuser releases agression. In stage three he becomes aware of the damage he has
done, feels guilty, and becomes apologetic. L. WALKER, THE BATTERED WomAN 64 (1979).
4. Id. at 60.
5. See A. Ganley Ph.D., Court-Mandated Counseling for Men Who Batter: A Three
Day workshop for Men Who Batter, Participants' Manual 7-36 (1981) (Center for Women's
Policy Studies, Washington, D.C.) (discusses denial and minimization of violent behavior by
men who batter). The batterer's view that violence is not serious is reinforced by police
acceptance of some violence as normal or even appropriate. R. DOBASH & R. DOBASH, VIO-
LENCE AGAINST WivEs: A CASE AGAINST THE PATRIARCH 212-17 (1979).
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night until a bond hearing the next morning or by escorting the
abuser elsewhere for the night. Alternatively, the police may take
the victim to a shelter.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON WARRANTLESS ARREST
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution'
prohibits the issuance of a warrant for arrest unless there is proba-
ble cause to believe both that a crime has been committed and that
the person arrested committed it.7 The Constitution has also been
interpreted to require probable cause for warrantless arrests.
A recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Payton v. New York, 9
limited the power of the police to make a warrantless arrest in the
home of the person arrested. The Court held that "the Fourth
Amendment . . . prohibits the police from making a warrantless
and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a
routine felony arrest."10 Because most domestic abuse occurs in the
home of the suspect, this decision must be closely examined to de-
termine the constitutionality of state laws expanding police power
to make warrantless arrests in domestic cases.
The Payton decision invalidated two warrantless arrests in the
homes of the persons arrested. In one case the police entered the
apartment of a suspect by breaking the door with a crowbar. No
crime was in progress in the dwelling." In the other case, a suspect
was arrested in his home by police who had not obtained a warrant
even though they had known his address for two months before
they tried to make the arrest."
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens stated that "we have
no occasion to consider the sort of emergency or dangerous situa-
tion, described in our cases as 'exigent circumstances,' that would
justify a warrantless entry into the home for the purpose of either
6. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
7. "Probable cause" means that the arresting officer must have "reasonably trustworthy
information" in light of any "facts and circumstances" that would lead a reasonably cau-
tious person to believe that an offense had been or was being committed. Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 313 (1959) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924)).
8. Id. See also Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1963).
9. Payton v. New York, - U.S. -, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980).
10. Id. at , 100 S. Ct. at 1374-75.
11. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1375.
12. Id. at , 100 S. Ct. at 1376.
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arrest or search."" He also noted that "in both cases we are deal-
ing with entries into homes made without the consent of any occu-
pant."" Since domestic violence cases usually involve "exigent cir-
cumstances,"' 5 and since the police would often enter with the
consent of one occupant, the victim, this decision does not appear
to apply to domestic abuse arrest laws.
Warrantless arrest laws have been challenged in state courts.
On March 27, 1980, the Supreme Court of Florida, in LeBlanc v.
State, 6 upheld a state law allowing a warrantless arrest by a police
officer where:
The officer has probable cause to believe that the person has
committed a battery upon the person's spouse, and the
officer:
(a) finds evidence of bodily harm; or
(b) the officer reasonably believes that there is dan-
ger of violence unless the person alleged to have
committed the battery is arrested without delay."
The Florida Supreme Court upheld the statute against a chal-
lenge that the application of the law to spouse abusers violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment ' 8 because it
treated spouses differently from other persons. The court held that
"[ilt is not a requirement of equal protection that every statutory
classification be all-inclusive. . . . Rather, the statute must merely
apply equally to the members of the statutory class and bear a
reasonable relation to some legitimate state interest. . . We find
that the statute clearly satisfies this rationality test."1'
Some laws use the language "for good cause shown" 0 or "rea-
son to believe ''2 1 in place of "probable cause." This language has
been challenged as allowing arrest without probable cause in viola-
13. Id. at -, 100 S. Ct. at 1378.
14. Id.
15. Generally speaking, "exigent circumstances" may be said to exist when the
demands of the occasion reasonably call for an immediate police response.
Thus a warrantless entry may be justified when required to prevent immi-
nent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the likely
escape of a suspect or the threatened removal or destruction of evidence.
State v. Lloyd, - Hawaii -, -, 606 P.2d 913, 918 (1980).
16. Le Blanc v. State, 382 So.2d 299 (Fla. 1980).
17. Id. at 300 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.15(6) (West Supp. 1981)).
18. U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 1.
19. 382 So.2d at 300.
20. E.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1205 (Supp. 1981).
21. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8 (Supp. 1981).
[Vol. 7:59
Expansion of Arrest Power
tion of the fourth amendment. At least one court has held, how-
ever, that such language is synonymous with "probable cause," and
that a statute using the former language is not unconstitutional.2'
II. STATE ARREST LAWS
State law may not abolish the probable cause requirement.
However, within the limits imposed by the fourth amendment, 3
police authority to arrest is defined by state law. In most states,
one law dictates standards for warrantless arrest in cases in which
an officer has probable cause to believe that a felony, most often
defined as a crime punishable by more than one year in jail, has
been committed," or where an officer witnesses the commission of
a misdemeanor, usually defined as an offense punishable by less
than one year in jail.'3
These standards have been criticized by scholars of criminal
law, and are particularly inappropriate for domestic violence cases.
Wayne LaFave, for example, suggests that standards for warrant-
less arrest should be based on the need for immediate action,
rather than on the felony/misdemeanor distinction.26 The Ameri-
can Law Institute recommends that statutes authorizing warrant-
less arrest adopt the following standards:
(1) Authority to Arrest Without a Warrant-A law enforce-
ment officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the of-
ficer has reasonable cause to believe that such a person has
committed
(a) a felony;
(b) a misdemeanor, and the officer has reasonable cause to
believe that such person
(i) will not be apprehended unless immediately ar-
rested; or
(ii) may cause injury to himself or others or damage
to property unless immediately arrested; or
(c) a misdemeanor or petty misdemeanor in the officer's
presence."
These recommendations for change in the state arrest laws make
22. City of Columbus v. Herrell, 18 Ohio App. 2d 149, - , 247 N.E.2d 770, 773 (1969).
23. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
24. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.16 (West 1973 & Supp. 1981).
25. E.g., D.C. CODE § 23-581 (1973).
26. W. LAFAvs, Aiums 18 (1965).
27. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE Op PEE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 120.1
(1975).
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clear that domestic abuse cases are just one of several types of
emergency situations in which warrantless arrest is necessary and
appropriate.
Arrest standards based on a misdemeanor/felony distinction
discourage arrest in most domestic abuse cases. Police generally
view family abuse as a minor offense, especially if there has been
no serious injury or if the injury is not visible. If mate abuse is
treated as a misdemeanor, and the law allows warrantless arrest
only in felony cases, the police may not arrest because the process
of obtaining a warrant may take hours or days. Misdemeanor ar-
rest warrants are generally issued only when a victim files a private
criminal complaint;2 they are rarely sought by police officers who
answer domestic disputes.
III. NEW WARRANTLESS ARREST LAWS
Currently, a policy favoring arrest of abusers is reflected in the
laws of twenty-seven states which authorize police to make war-
rantless arrests, either for misdemeanor offenses in domestic abuse
cases or for violation of protection orders, or both.2 9 Abolishing the
requirement that a warrant be obtained prior to arrest is an impor-
tant step in activating the criminal justice system to reduce family
violence.
In twenty-one states, arrest laws allow warrantless arrest for
misdemeanor offenses committed against family members.3 0 Most
28. Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic Disturbance, 1967 Wis. L. REv. 914,
936-37.
29. In addition to those statutes appearing at infra note 30, see Mo. ANN. STAT. §
455.085 (Vernon Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
14-07.1-01 to .1-08, 29-01-15(4) (Supp. 1979) as amended; 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10190
(Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 36-1205, 36-1213 (Supp. 1981); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 30-6-8 (Supp. 1981).
30. ALASKA STAT. § 12.25.030(b)(1980); Amuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602 (Supp. 1980);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901-15(6)(West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-7 (Supp. 1981); HAWAII
REv. STAT. § 709-906 (Supp. 1980); IDAHO CODE § 19-603 (Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch.
38, § 107-2 (Smith-Hurd 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431.005 (Baldwin 1981); ME. Rav.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 301 (Supp. 1981) as amended by 1981 Me. Legis. Serv. ch. 420; MAss.
ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 28 (Michie/Law Co-op 1980); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§ 764.15a,
769.4a, 772.13, 772.14a (Supp. 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1980); NEv.
REv. STAT. § 171.124 (1979); N.H. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 594:10-1 (Supp. 1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-1-7 (Supp. 1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. § 155 (McKinney Supp. 1980) as amended by
1981 N.Y. Laws, ch. 416, & N.Y. CODE CaIM. PROC. § 530.12 (McKinney Supp. 1980) as
amended by 1981 N.Y. Laws, ch. 416; OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03 (Baldwin 1979); OR.
REv. STAT. §§ 133.055, 133.515 (1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-9 (Supp. 1980); TEX. CraIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (Vernon 1977) as amended by 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., Ch. 422;
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of these allow warrantless arrest where an act of physical abuse has
occurred."1 Some, in addition, allow warrantless arrest where
"there is substantial likelihood of immediate danger of that [adult
family] member being abused.3- 2
Many of the new laws impose other conditions that must be
met before a warrantless arrest can be made. Some reflect a con-
cern that warrantless arrests be made only in emergencies. In Min-
nesota"3 and New Hampshire,3 4 the domestic abuse laws allow war-
rantless arrest only within a few hours of the incident of abuse. In
Rhode Island,38 warrantless arrest is allowed within 24 hours of
abuse. In addition, Minnesota 6 and Nevada 7 preclude warrantless
arrest for domestic violence unless there is physical evidence of
abuse.
Most of these new laws either mention domestic abuse or were
enacted as part of a package of domestic violence legislation. In a
few states, arrest powers have been broadened without reference to
domestic abuse, but with the effect that warrantless arrest is per-
mitted in some domestic abuse cases. Illinois law, for example, al-
lows warrantless arrest for any misdemeanor offense based on
probable cause alone. 8 In Nebraska, warrantless misdemeanor ar-
rest is allowed when the officer has witnessed the offense or if the
suspect may get away, injure another, or destroy evidence of the
offense unless arrested immediately. 9
Warrantless arrest by a police officer who has probable cause
to believe that a protection order has been violated is permitted by
statute in fourteen states. 0 Some of these laws allow arrest for acts
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.31.100, 10.99.030(3)(a) (1980).
31. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 629.341 (Supp. 1980).
32. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
33. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1980) (within four hours).
34. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 549:10-1 (Supp. 1979) (within six hours).
35. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-9 (Supp. 1980).
36. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1980).
37. NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.124(1)(f) (1979).
38. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
39. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-404.02 (1979).
40. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3602(I) (Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-2
(Smith-Hurd 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769(2) (1964) & id. § 770 (Supp. 1981-82);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 28 (Michie/Law Co-op 1980); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §§
764.15a, 769.4a, 772.13, 772.14a (Supp. 1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.085 (Vernon Supp.
1981); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. §§ 155, 168 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980-81); N.C. GEN STAT. §
50B-4 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07.1-06 (Supp. 1979) as amended; OR. REV. STAT.
§ 133.310 (1973); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10190 (Purdon 1977 & Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE
1982]
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which could not be the basis of an independent criminal charge,
such as contact with the victim or failure to attend counseling. The
issuance of a protection order renders such action a misde-
meanor,4 1 contempt of court' 2 or both.' s
Before a protection order becomes effective it must be served
on the abuser. A statute allowing warrantless arrest for violation of
a protection order is more likely to be enforced if it includes lan-
guage requiring a law enforcement agency to deliver orders to
abusers. If the law does not require free delivery of orders by a
specific agency within a certain period of time, police officers or
sheriffs may delay delivery or may charge for the service."
An abuser may not be arrested for violation of a protection
order unless he has received a copy of the order and the police
have verified that an order is currently in effect. This can be done
either by providing victims with certified copies of protection or-
ders, or by setting up a procedure to enable police to verify the
existence of an effective order, or both.
Some state laws require that the court deliver a copy of each
protection order to the local police department. Oregon provides
for verification by requiring that a certified copy of each protection
order and proof of service be kept on file in the police depart-
ment.'4 Massachusetts, in addition, requires that "[1]aw enforce-
ment agencies shall establish procedures adequate to insure that
an officer at the scene of an alleged violation. . . may be informed
of the existence and terms of such [an] order.' '46 If protection or-
ders are filed in a building open only during regular office hours,
verification is difficult. In large cities, protection orders should be
recorded on a computer system, so that radio verification can be
made from anywhere in the city.
Several states have passed criminal laws making spouse abuse
a separate offense.' 7 Some of these allow warrantless arrest where a
ANN. § 36-1213 (Supp. 1981); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 14.03 (Vernon 1977) as
amended by 1981 Tex. Sess. Law Serv., ch. 422; UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2) (Supp. 1981).
41. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8 (Supp. 1981).
42. E.g., W. VA. CODE § 48-2a-7 (1980).
43. E.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 769 (1964).
44. Presentation by Chris Butler, Massachusetts Coalition of Battered Women Services
Groups, Northeast Conference on Women & the Law, March 29, 1980.
45. OR. REV. STAT. § 133.310(3)(b) (1973).
46. MAss. ANN. LAWS. ch. 208, § 34C (Michie Law Co-op 1981).
47. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41.1653 (Supp. 1981); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 2734, 1000.6-.11
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charge of spouse assault is filed. In Ohio, for example, a first of-
fense of spouse assault is a first degree misdemeanor, and subse-
quent offenses may be charged as fourth degree felonies. Where a
charge is filed under this statute, police may arrest without a war-
rant. The Ohio law allows arrest upon "the execution of a written
statement by a person alleging that an alleged offender has com-
mitted the offense [of domestic violence] against the person or
against a child of the person. '48
IV. MANDATORY ARREST
While most of the new laws expand the authority of the police
to make arrests, only a few require that they be made when there
is probable cause to arrest for spousal assault. Those state statutes
which impose a mandatory duty to arrest abusers are Maine,"
Minnesota,5 0 North Carolina,51 Oregon," and Utah.53 They differ
from the other laws in that "shall arrest" is used in place of "may
arrest."
54
Under the Oregon law, the duty to arrest is imposed only in
cases in which the victim does not object.55 Conditioning the duty
to arrest on the consent of the victim may render the mandate in-
effective. If a victim is asked in the presence of her abuser if she
objects to the making of an arrest, she may be afraid to consent. If
the wishes of the victim are to be taken into account by criminal
justice officials, the victim should be consulted under circum-
stances where she may safely express her feelings. The primary
duty of the police is to assess the danger and protect the safety of
the victim. Police should not be required to act as social workers,a
and should be empowered to make an arrest without the victim's
consent if necessary.
The inclusion of explicit mandatory duties in state arrest laws
is desirable for several reasons. First, it makes clear a legislative
intent to increase the number of arrests made in family abuse
(West Supp. 1981).
48. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2935.03(B) (Baldwin 1979).
49. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (Supp. 1981).
50. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (West Supp. 1980).
51. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4 (Supp. 1979).
52. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 133.035, 133.310 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
53. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-6-8(2), 77-13-3(3) (1978 & Supp. 1981).
54. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 133.035, 133.310 (1973 & Supp. 1979).
55. See State v. Marshall, 105 N.E.2d 891 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1952).
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cases. Second, it reduces police discretion to treat family violence
as a trivial matter. Third, if the law prescribes a mandatory duty,
the failure of the police to make an arrest where probable cause is
present is a violation of the law and the basis for a lawsuit."'
Two such lawsuits were filed in November of 1980 against po-
lice departments in Oregon by Oregon Legal Services Corporation
on behalf of two battered women.5 A similar suit is pending in
Florida, in which a battered woman who killed her husband after
the police refused to arrest him is suing the police for violation of
their statutory duty.5 8 Florida law, though it includes discretionary
language, has been interpreted to impose a duty on police to take
precautions to protect a class of persons unable to protect
themselves. 9
V. POLICE IMMUNITY
Most laws expanding police power to make warrantless arrests
for domestic abuse explicitly protect the police from civil liability
for any action taken in a "good faith" effort to enforce the law. 0
Police may be reluctant to make an arrest if they perceive the situ-
ation as one of mutual combat, or if the victim objects to the of-
fender's arrest. Even if a battered woman urges that the police ar-
rest her mate, some police fear that the parties may reconcile and
sue for false arrest. The good faith immunity provisions are a legis-
lative response to these frequently articulated fears of suits for
false arrest.
The immunity clauses in the arrest laws do not completely
56. See Woods, Litigation on Behalf of Battered Women, 5 WOMENS RIGHTS L. REP. 7
(1978).
57. Nearing v. Weaver, No. 26761 (Cir. Ct., Columbia Cty., OR, filed Nov. 13, 1980);
Kubitscheck v. Winnett, No. 8587 (Cir. Ct. Hood River Cty., OR, filed Feb. 20, 1980). In
both cases protection orders (referred to in Oregon law as restraining orders) were in effect
and defendant police officers knew or had probable cause to believe that they had been
violated. In late 1981 the Kubitscheck case was settled after motions for an undisclosed but
substantial sum of money. (Telephone interview with Ruth Gundle, Oregon Legal Services,
attorney for plaintiffs, December, 1981).
58. Plaintiffs' Memorapdum of Law in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
Buckhannan v. Miami, No. 80-14830 (Cir. Ct. Fla. March 30, 1981) (on file at the Center for
Women Policy Studies).
59. Id., De Jesus v. Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 281 So.2d 198 (Fla. 1973);
Tamiami Gun Shop v. Klein, 109 So.2d 189 (Fla. 1959), cert. discharged 116 So.2d 121 (Fla.
1959).
60. E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-134.3(19) (1978 & Supp. 1979); OR. REV. STAT. § 13.315
(Supp. 1979).
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shield the police from liability. They would not necessarily defeat a
lawsuit requesting an injunction against police misconduct," or a
suit for damages for police misconduct where absence of good faith
could be proven.62 Neither does the qualified immunity provided
by the arrest laws prohibit suit under federal civil rights laws.5 In
fact, the good faith standard is the same as that articulated by the
courts regarding police liability for civil rights violations."
While the laws cannot guarantee that police will not be sued
for false arrest, the good faith immunity clauses will protect police
who make arrests only when they believe that they have the au-
thority to do so."
CONCLUSION
The trend, now reflected in a majority of state statutes, toward
allowing warrantless arrest in wife abuse cases, reflects a develop-
ing consensus in the domestic violence movement that traditional
law enforcement by police is more useful in deterring subsequent
abuse than the mediation/crisis intervention approach developed
in the early seventies.
The expansion of arrest power may also be viewed as part of
the increasing focus on rights of crime victims and a corresponding
reduction of defendant's rights. The question of whether to require
a warrant for the arrest of a wife abuser provides an important
case study because it presents a direct conflict between the princi-
61. Suits to enjoin illegal police conduct are generally based on a pattern of repeated
misconduct and a serious danger that the action in question will recur. See Long v. District
of Columbia, 469 F.2d 927, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1972). While a showing of good faith might defeat
such an action, the statutory protection would not automatically bar the issuance of an
injunction.
62. See Kubitscheck v. Winnet, No. 8587 (Cir. Ct. Hood Cty., OR, filed Feb. 20, 1980);
Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 176-77 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1977).
63. See Guerro v. Mulhearn 498, F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1974) (state law indemnifying po-
lice officers by their public employers for damages incurred in a lawsuit arising out of the
performance of their duties held not to immunize police from suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1983).
64. Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d at 176.
65. The Supreme Court listed factors to be considered in determining whether a police
officer is immune from liability because he acted in good faith: "It is the existence of reason-
able grounds for the belief [that cause for action existed] formed at the time and in light of
all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immu-
nity." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974). Another court held that a policeman
could establish immunity by proving that he reasonably believed that he had probable cause
to make an arrest. Testa v. Winquist, 451 F. Supp. 388 (D. R.I. 1978).
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ple that a man's home is his castle and the often urgent need to
invade the sanctity of that home to protect the victim of a crime.
